

TS# 206736
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-41
25 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT : Security Review of Murphy Commission Report

REFERENCE : Murphy Commission Draft Report Intelligence,
Dated 14 February 1975

1. (U) At your request the reference draft report on
Intelligence by the Murphy Commission was reviewed for possible
security violations.

2. (S) The report contains several references to the
satellite reconnaissance program and the National Reconnaissance
Office. The fact that the United States Government conducts a
photographic satellite reconnaissance program for foreign intelligence
collection is officially classified SECRET. The requirement for such

Satellites, " copy attached. Accordingly, those sections of the report
containing reference to the satellite program should be classified
SECRET in accordance with the requirements of this memorandum
and Executive Order 11652.

Chairman

Attachment

This memorandum may be down-
graded to SECRET when removed
from attachment.

CL BY [REDACTED]
E 2, 3 IMPDET

NSC review(s) completed.


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February 18, 1975

STATINTL


Office of the Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.


Dear John:

The enclosed draft of the entire report on intelligence was discussed by Commissioners on our subcommittee on February 18. My marginal notes are shown, and some general comments, identified by the section of the report concerned, are attached on separate note sheets. Tom Reckford will do the rewrite.

An additional copy is being passed to Andy Marshall for review and comment by DOD, as was previously done. Let me reiterate that the material is being passed along informally on my own authority for comment. We definitely do not want to make any substantive errors or security violations.

In case you think the draft might have been stronger (which I do), another set of papers are enclosed which indicate what I have managed to keep out of the final report. It has been a real hassle. Although I am not particularly proud of the finished product, at least most of the main points are included and very little damaging material has crept in. Let me know if that assessment appears incorrect to you.

Sincerely,



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who is its Chairman and can overrule its other members (which has happened only once). The USIB is composed of major U.S. agencies with intelligence responsibilities and has seven members and four observers (see Chart 3). The preponderance of military representatives has been criticized from time to time by previous study groups.

The USIB's responsibilities have been modified from time to time by revision of NSCID-1. It is currently a substantive body required to advise the DCI on:

- the establishment of intelligence requirements and priorities,
- the production of national intelligence estimates (members and observers may dissent officially from an NIE statement or conclusion),
- the supervision of dissemination and security of intelligence reports,
- the protection of intelligence sources and methods, and
- the policies regulating liaison with foreign governments.

There are thirteen standing USIB committees (see Chart 4) and over fifty subcommittees and working groups covering major aspects of collection, production, warning intelligence, and security.

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and Ford have continued the Board. Under the terms of President Nixon's 1969 Executive Order, PFIAB is directed to:

- advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the overall national intelligence effort;
- conduct a continuing review and assessment of foreign intelligence and related activities; and
- receive, consider and take appropriate action on matters identified to the Board by the intelligence community in which support of the Board will improve the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort.

Members of PFIAB are appointed by the President from among persons outside the government and serve at his discretion. The Board has a staff headed by an Executive Secretary, also appointed by the President.

(See Section VIII on Oversight for further details and Commission recommendations.)

F. The Principal Intelligence Agencies.

The major elements of the intelligence community are the following:

The CIA:

The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947, which stipulates that the duties of the Agency

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II. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The DCI, quite clearly and purposefully, wears two hats. He is the principal adviser to the President and the NSC for intelligence and is responsible for leadership of the intelligence community as a whole. He is also the head of DCI. Not surprisingly, over the years proposals have frequently, and responsibly, been put forward to separate these two functions into two distinct positions, thus seeking to reduce the burden and to avoid what appeared at times to be a conflict of interest between the two duties. For reasons which the Commission believes to be altogether sound, this course has not been followed: neither of the two responsibilities could be strongly, or even adequately, discharged if divided. A DCI without his own agency would have great difficulty filling a leadership role in the community; an independent intelligence agency without a leadership responsibility would be at the mercy of the several departments, particularly the military.

In 1971, however, the President, on the recommendation of the Schlesinger Report, chose a compromise course: the DCI, while still in line responsibility over the CIA, should remove himself from the day-to-day direction of the agency and concentrate on his Community responsibilities. This directive, admittedly difficult to achieve, was never fully

carried out. The Commission, however, is impressed with its validity as a concept and with the undesirability of having the DCI preside over matters in which he is himself an interested party. In terms at least of the delegation of authority, the pattern of Chairman of the Board and President of a business enterprise, although only partially analagous, suggests itself in this connection. In this way the DCI should be significantly freed of a major management load but at the same time would not be wholly stripped of line responsibility which inevitably enhances his leadership capability.

RECOMMENDATION : The Director of Central Intelligence should retain line authority over the CIA but delegate to the fullest possible extent the day-to-day management responsibility to the Deputy Director of the agency and himself concentrate on the important leadership role of the Intelligence Community.

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The Commission has given some thought to the character and background of the person to be a DCI: what are the principal qualities the President should look for in selecting a man for this taxing position, particularly as intelligence functions are, and inevitably will be, at once controversial and prominent in the public eye. In essence -- and apart from the obvious qualities of leadership, integrity, managerial talent and substantive knowledge of foreign affairs -- two perhaps conflicting demands are presented. There is need for a man with experience and professional talent in the highly technical field of intelligence. At the same time, there is need for someone with high public standing, one at home in the swirl of political life, in short, a man of cabinet stature. The Commission believes that the latter qualifications should be dominant. Without excluding the possibility of a professional career officer achieving the position -- even as a Foreign Service Officer "could be" Secretary of State -- the Commission would favor the position being filled by a public figure, a "political" appointment.

RECOMMENDATION : The position of DCI should be filled by someone with the strong personal confidence of the President. Future DCIs should probably be drawn from public life, comparable to Cabinet officers. Their tenure should normally end with the change of Administration.

III. POLICYMAKERS AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Some policymakers ask of the intelligence agencies only that they report fully and accurately the overseas developments with which foreign policy is concerned. They want "facts" and prefer to take care of the analysis themselves. Policymakers of this school believe that their global perspective, personal knowledge of world leaders, and familiarity with the range of policy options give their analysis a validity that cannot be matched by intelligence officers. They argue that analysis and estimates by those not directly involved in the policy process so lack relevance or are so cautiously hedged as to be almost useless.

At times this view is probably quite valid, especially when intelligence officers are not privy to policy planning and diplomatic conversations at the highest levels of the U. S. Government. On the other hand, intelligence officers see their role in a somewhat different light. They argue that they should indeed follow and report on important developments overseas, but they also see their function as:

- alerting policymakers of impending opportunities and problems;
- estimating future developments, to reduce the areas of uncertainty and risk in policy formulation;

- appraising, particularly when requested by policy-makers, the probable foreign consequences and reactions to alternative courses of action; and
- monitoring results of policy initiatives.

These differences of view, not always so sharply drawn, cannot be resolved by fiat. Much depends on personal attitudes on both sides. Furthermore, a natural tension between intelligence and policymakers should be taken for granted because, if the national intelligence analysts do their job well, objectively and critically, they will at times present a picture of the external world which challenges basic assumptions and may even demonstrate a situation to be largely intractable to initiatives by U. S. policymakers. A good intelligence organization will frequently be a messenger of bad news; an excellent one will frequently be a designer of unfamiliar mosaics. In any event, each side must constantly strive for understanding of the other.

If policymakers want useful intelligence support, they must tell intelligence officers what they are doing. Intelligence officers can hardly be expected to interpret the actions of foreign governments successfully, if they are unaware of U. S. initiatives that may be influencing the decisions of other states. Moreover, intelligence cannot be of much help if it is not kept informed of current policy thinking in the U. S.. Procedures must be established to

III. (Continued)

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make available, under whatever security restrictions must apply, full information on current activities and policy deliberations.

In addition, as major studies on intelligence have pointed out over the years, intelligence needs constant and constructive evaluation of its product and pointers about what subjects are of special interest. The lack of effective guidance to the intelligence agencies can result in the preparation of reports of little or no interest in misguided priorities, and in the collection of too much "raw" information of insufficient quality and usefulness. Indeed, most policymakers regard intelligence as a "free good" and thus set no limits on their requests for intelligence support.

The intelligence community's work has become largely responsive to its own perceptions of what is important. The uneven quality of policy guidance for the intelligence community has long been recognized, but until recently not much has been done about it. The NSC structure of the Eisenhower administration provided a "cueing system" for intelligence production, but, since that time, the intelligence community has had to generate and evaluate most of its own products. The Schlesinger Report of 1971, however, and the Presidential memorandum which followed, sought greater "responsiveness of the U. S. Intelligence effort to national

III. (Continued)

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needs" and "improvement in the quality, scope, and timeliness of intelligence information." To this end, it called for:

- an enhanced leadership role with respect to requirements and overall planning for the DCI, the principal intelligence adviser to the President and the only intelligence officer regularly attending key NSC subcommittees and Cabinet meetings,
- establishment of a National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC), chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to provide guidance on intelligence and intelligence management needs,
- inclusion of a representative of the Treasury Department on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB),
- establishment of a Net Assessments Group within the NSC staff (moved to the Defense Department in 1973) to draw a balance sheet for U. S. and Soviet military strength,
- establishment of an "Intelligence Community Staff," among other things, to assist the DCI in assessing the performance of the community and to probe consumer attitudes.

III. (Continued)

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The DCI then created several new institutions to enhance the relevance, timeliness, quality, and efficiency of intelligence analysis. His staff began producing five-year plans to provide perspective on future conditions for intelligence and "Key Intelligence Questions" (KIQs) to engage principal consumers in the requirements process. The KIQs, which are direct linear descendants of previous priorities' lists, are useful but hardly a cure-all in the requirements field. The DCI also replaced the old Board of National Estimates with National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) to channel consumer requests and to supervise the production of National Intelligence Estimates.

Most of these new steps are beginning to prove their worth, but the key one -- the NSCIC -- has been a disappointment to date. It has met only a few times since its inception, presumably because its members are extremely busy. In addition to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, its members now are the DCI (vice-chairman), the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs.

Two subcommittees of the NSCIC, however, have recently begun to show some life. The first is the NSCIC Working Group,

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